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Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union?  
New evidence on preference heterogeneity, polarization, and crosscuttingness 
 
Thomas Hale and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
 
Abstract 
Some scholars and policy-makers argue in favour of increasing democratic contestation for 
leadership and policy at the European level, for instance by having European-wide parties campaign 
for competing candidates for president of the European Commission ahead of European Parliament 
elections. But would such changes put the survival of the EU at risk? According to the 
consociational interpretation of the EU, the near absence of competitive and majoritarian elements 
has been a necessary condition for the stability of the EU political system given its highly diverse 
population. This paper contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it develops a more precise 
understanding of “problematic” diversity by examining how three variables – the heterogeneity, 
polarization and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices – affect the risk of 
democratic contestation generating persistent and systematically dissatisfied minorities. Second, it 
uses opinion surveys to determine whether the degree of diversity of the European population is 
problematically high compared to that of established democratic states. We find that the population 
of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarized than the population of the average member 
state, although policy preferences in several member states are more heterogeneous and polarized 
than the EU as a whole. Strikingly, however, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in 
the EU than in nearly all member states, reducing the risk of permanent minorities. Moreover, 
policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarized, and nearly as crosscutting, in the 
EU as a whole as in the United States. For observers worried about how high polarization and low 
crosscuttingness in policy preferences may combine to threaten democratic stability, our findings 











Would politics in the European Union (EU) benefit from greater contestation over policy, or is the 
European public too diverse and divided to sustain the kinds of democratic procedures practiced in 
its member states? Different perspectives on this question came to the fore in the process of 
selecting the president of the European Commission in 2014. The Lisbon Treaty provides that the 
European Parliament (EP) elects the president of the European Commission on the basis of a 
proposal made by the European Council, taking into account the EP elections. The main European-
wide political parties selected candidates for Commission president (Spitzenkandidaten) in 
preparation for the EP elections held in May 2014. The candidate of the party that gathered the 
largest share of the vote, Jean Claude Juncker of the European People’s Party, was nominated by the 
European Council in June 2014 and then elected as Commission president by the EP in July 2014. 
While some hailed the Spitzenkandidaten experiment as a successful step towards the 
democratization of the EU, others maintained that the process had weakened the legitimacy of the 
EU, arguing that the democratic legitimization of EU policy-making ultimately depends on the 
consent of national governments accountable to national electorates via national parliaments.
2
 
The position that democracy in the EU would benefit from greater contestation over political 
leadership and policy had been discussed among scholars long before it was taken up by the parties 
competing in the 2014 election. Simon Hix and Andreas Follesdal presented particularly forceful 
and systematic arguments on the desirability and feasibility of increased democratic contestation in 
EU politics. It is desirable, the argument goes, because the ability of citizens to consider and choose 
between alternative policy platforms offered by competing political coalitions is a core democratic 
value (Hix 1997; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hix 2008; Follesdal 2011). It is feasible because politics 
has already been moving in a more competitive direction within the main EU institutions: the 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and, especially, the Parliament.  
                                                 
1
 We are grateful to Simon Hix, Mareike Kleine, Jonathan White, and three anonymous EJPR reviewers for 
insightful comments. Robert Goodin helped us improve an important aspect. We remain responsible for all 
shortcomings. 
2For an analysis of the controversy see Shackleton (2014). The president of the Eurosceptic European 
Conservatives and Reformists explained his group’s decision not to nominate a candidate by stating that the 
lack a European demos makes any process of directly electing a European Commission president illegitimate 
(Keating 2014). For another critical perspective see, for instance, The Economist (2014). 
 3 
Such arguments advocating more contestation over political leaders and policies run against an 
interpretation of the EU that has attracted considerable support in the past twenty years. According 
to this interpretation, the EU has survived for more than half a century precisely because it lacks 
majoritarian features. The institutional and political characteristics of the EU are analogous to those 
found in “consociational democracies”: all major political groups are included in the policy-making 
process and, within limits, they are able to veto key decisions. According to an influential political 
science theory, consociational institutions and practices promote the stability of democracy in 
divided societies, which would otherwise be at risk of mass disaffection and even breakdown under 
a majoritarian system. The implication of the consociational interpretation of the EU is that 
strengthening the majoritarian elements in the EU would be risky as long as Europeans’ policy 
views remains highly diverse. For instance, Fritz Scharpf stresses that the EU is much more 
heterogeneous than any national “consensus democracy” and warns that the multiple-veto 
community method of European legislation “could not be replaced by the constitution of a Europe-
wide Westminster-style democracy without destroying the legitimacy of the union” (Scharpf 2015, 
271). Already in the wake of the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, Joseph Weiler had cautioned 
that allowing minorities to be outvoted by majorities “may bring about a decline in the social 
legitimacy of the polity with consequent dysfunctions and even disintegration” (Weiler 1993, 23).  
To be sure, what is at stake in the debate is not the EU’s transformation from a “pure” 
consociational to a “pure” majoritarian system, but the consequences of a shift along the 
intermediate regions on the continuum between those two poles. The empirical evidence Hix 
presents in support of the readiness of the EU for such a shift does not assuage the concerns raised 
by the consociational interpretation. He shows that competition based on political ideologies is 
increasingly important for a variety of political actors at the European level. But the consociational 
argument refers not only to the behaviour of political elites but also to the attitudes of ordinary 
citizens. The problem solved by consociational institutions and practices is located mainly at the 
societal level, in the structure of social cleavages in a society. Thus, European political elites may 
be ready for more majoritarianism and competition, but we need to ask whether European citizens 
are ready as well.
3
 This article investigates this question.  
We do so by analysing and subjecting to empirical scrutiny a key assumption of the consociational 
argument, i.e. that the boundaries of the EU encompass a highly divided society. This involves 
several tasks. First, we examine the logic of pluralist and consociational theories and conclude that 
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 See White (2010) for another attempt to enlarge the focus of the debate to include citizens’ attitudes, but 
approaching the question from an angle that is critical of the cleavage-based approach taken here.  
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for both theoretical approaches the problem of persistent minorities – sizeable population groups 
that are systematically outvoted on most issues they care about – represents the main threat to the 
stability of a democratic system. Second, we develop a precise understanding of what makes a 
society highly divided that is based on three concepts and related empirical measures: the 
heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices. We 
argue that the risk of persistent minorities is particularly serious when two conditions are present at 
the same time: polarization on policy issues is high and crosscuttingness across issues is low. Third,  
we develop an empirical strategy for the measurement of those variables, including a novel method 
for assessing the crosscuttingness of public policy preferences, and apply it to data drawn from 
European and global opinion surveys, which focus on the economic left-right dimensions, the 
cultural traditionalism-libertarianism dimensions, and the pro-/anti-European integration dimension 
(due to data limitations we cannot address support/acceptance for redistribution across countries). 
Fourth, we compare the values of crosscuttingness and heterogeneity of the EU as a whole with 
those of its member states, with various regional groupings within the EU, and with the United 
States of America. We use this comparison as a basis for assessing whether policy preferences 
among EU citizens should be considered problematically divided of not. In sum, our aim is to 
assess the empirical basis of an important objection to calls for an increase of democratic 
competition in the EU.  
Our analysis reveals some striking findings. The population of the EU is slightly more 
heterogeneous and polarized than the population of the average member state, although policy 
preferences in several member states are more heterogeneous and polarized than the EU as a whole. 
Moreover, we find that the EU as a whole is usually not more heterogeneous/polarized  than each of 
its subregions (northern, southern, and eastern member states). At the same time, policy preference 
cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU as a whole than in almost all member states. Moreover, 
policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarized, and nearly as crosscutting, in the 
EU as a whole as in the US. For observers worried about how high polarization and low 
crosscuttingness may combine to threaten democratic stability, our findings should be reassuring: 
slightly above-average heterogeneity and polarization in the EU as a whole is balanced by above-
average crosscuttingness. We conclude that, to the extent that the structure of substantive policy 
preferences matters, European citizens are ready for more democratic contestation in EU 
institutions. 
This conclusion removes a key objection to increased majoritarianism in the EU. But we do not aim 
to offer an exhaustive discussion of the issues. First, we do not directly address the question of 
whether an increase in democratic competition would be normatively desirable in the light of 
 5 
philosophical theories of political legitimacy. Second, for reasons we explain below we do not 
address the important question of how democratic competition may shape the policy preferences of 
citizens and the formation of a collective democratic identity. Third, we do not touch a number of 
issues that are relevant for the broader debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, such as the 





Contestation and stability in the European Union 
Hix points at two prerequisites for the kind of “limited democratic politics” that he advocates for the 
EU: “(1) an institutional design that allows for a contest for leadership and control of the policy 
agenda, at least for a limited period; and (b) a pattern of elite behaviour where contestation is 
accepted and where losers in decisions are willing to accept the legitimacy of winners” (Hix 2008, 
4; see also p. 110). One of Hix’s central theses is that these two prerequisites are already in place in 
the EU. With regard to the institutional dimension, the EU has acquired some important 
majoritarian elements since the 1980s, notably the expansion of qualified majority voting in the 
Council and of the role of the European Parliament in the legislative process. With regard to 
patterns of elite behaviour, Hix notes that political conflicts in the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Commission are increasingly structured by left-right partisan divisions.
5
 Attempts 
to increase the democratic quality of EU politics through political contestation can build on these 
institutional and behavioural trends.  
It is notable that Hix does not explicitly mention any particular distribution of policy preferences 
among ordinary citizens as a “prerequisite” for limited democratic politics. This is probably due to 
his belief that “European citizens have remarkably similar basic economic and political values 
compared to the rest of the world” (Hix 2008, 22). To support this contention, he presents cross-
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 Important contributions to the vast literature on democracy in the EU include Lord (2001); Majone (2010); 
Moravcsik (2004); Nanz (2006); Neyer (2010); Papadopoulos (2010); Schmidt (2013); Schmitter (2000); 
Zürn (2000). Our findings are directly relevant to the normative idea of a European “demoicracy” in so far as 
its supporters are concerned about the outcomes of majoritarian decision rules. For instance, Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis notes that, “Above all, the lack of a European demos means that European citizens will not and 
should not accept to be bound by a majority of Europeans.” (Nicolaïdis 2013, 356). See also Cheneval and 
Schimmelfennig (2013) and Bellamy (2013).   
5
 For a selection of studies that document this trend, see Hooghe (2001), Mattila (2004), Hix et al. (2007), 
and Hagemann and Hoyland (2008). 
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national data on income inequality and religiosity, which are interpreted as showing a clustering of 
EU populations compared to the values displayed by non-EU countries. It seems fair to say that, in 
presenting the case for more political contestation in EU politics, Hix does not examine the degree 
of diversity in policy preferences among EU citizens in much depth. But is it necessary to do so? 
How much does this aspect really matter for determining whether “the EU is ready for limited 
democratic politics” or not? (Hix 2008, 110). 
According to the consociational interpretation of the EU,
6
 the political beliefs of the EU’s 
population matter a lot. In brief, the consociational interpretation consists of two propositions: (A) 
the EU polity encompasses a population that is very diverse with regard to politically relevant 
values and policy preferences; (B) a polity with such a degree of diversity has been able to survive 
only thanks to its consociational institutions and practices. Proposition B can also be stated in terms 
of a “trilemma” that connects high political diversity, majoritarianism and stability: at most two of 
them can exist at the same time, never all three. We will discuss what problematic political diversity 
consist of in the next section. What it is important to note here is that some proponents of the 
consociational interpretation are also explicit in stating an implication of the  attempts to reduce the 
consociational nature of EU politics and strengthen its majoritarian and competitive dimensions 
risks compromising the stability and survival of the EU (Gabel 1998, 471)Scharpf 2015, 271). 
Matthew Gabel warns that, “until the political salience of cross-national cleavages surpasses 
national cleavages, the deficit in public control over and participation in EU policymaking is 
necessary for stability” (Gabel 1998, 473). However, other proponents of the consociational 
interpretation see less of a tension. For instance, Yannis Papadopoulos and Paul Magnette refer to 
the experiences of Switzerland and Belgium to argue that the consociational system of the EU could 
absorb a significant degree of politicization before its stability would be compromised 
(Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010). 
In this article we do not attempt to evaluate proposition B directly. We rather aim to assess the 
empirical accuracy of its premise, i.e. proposition A. However, in order to understand what counts 
as diversity in the consociationalist interpretation, we need to reconstruct the logic on which it is 
based.  
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 In the following we summarize the essential arguments of various authors, with the proviso that their views 
and emphases may differ on important points. See Chryssochoou (1994); Costa and Magnette (2003); Crepaz 
(2002); Gabel (1998); Lindberg (1974); Papadopoulos and Magnette (2010); Scharpf (2015); Slater (1982); 
Taylor (1991). See also Fabbrini (2015). 
 7 
Consociational theory emerged as a response to the classical pluralist theory of the conditions of 
stability of political systems, specifically democratic systems. Pluralism located the crucial 
conditions of stability at the societal level, and specifically in the structure of politically relevant 
social divisions, or “cleavages. The crucial conceptual innovation of pluralism is that it did not see 
cleavages as such as problematic for political stability, but only those cleavages that reinforce each 
other. In an early contribution, E. A. Ross (1920, 164-165, quoted in  Coser (1956, 76-77) noted 
that a society “which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may 
actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split just along 
one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that 
society is sewn together by its inner conflicts.” Seymour Martin Lipset summed up the key insight 
of this tradition by writing that “...the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that 




The consociational theory pioneered by Arend Lijphart builds on the pluralist theory of cleavages 
but denies that reinforcing cleavages necessarily lead to instability (Lijphart 1968, 1996). It shares 
with pluralism the idea that “[s]egmented societies, defined by distinct subcultures with reinforcing 
social cleavages, are unstable settings for majoritarian democratic institutions--one party 
government, absolute majority rule, and centralized power” (Gabel 1998, 465). But it maintains that 
even democracies characterized by deep and reinforcing cleavages can be stable if institutions and 
practices conform to consociational principles. Based on the study of the Netherlands and other 
cases, Lijphart identified four such principles: “(1) grand coalition governments that include 
representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy for these groups, 
(3) proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and (4) a minority veto 
with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy” (Lijphart 1996, 258). A necessary condition for 
consociational stability is that mainstream political elites support integration and that opposition is 
confined to the fringes. 
Several authors have argued that, for most of its history, the EU met these or equivalent criteria and 
should therefore be considered a consociational political system.
8
 First, EU policies were decided 
mainly by political elites supportive of integration and acting as a grand coalition, where key 
decisions were subject to either formal unanimity requirements or informal consensus practices, 
often shielded from public scrutiny. Second, member states retained substantial autonomy in 
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 See also Truman (1951, 514), Dahl (1956, 104-105) and Dahrendorf (1959, 215). 
8
 See especially the works cited in footnote 5 above.  
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particularly sensitive policy areas, such as taxation, education, health and military affairs. Third, all 
component nationalities were represented in EU political and administrative bodies, with special 
attention to ensuring adequate representation to the smaller member states.
9
 As noted, for some 
scholars it is precisely the consociational character of the EU that explains its survival despite the 
existence of deep and reinforcing divisions (Gabel 1998).  
 
Which kind of divisions threaten stability? 
The preceding discussion of pluralist and consocionational theory was vague on which kind of 
divisions threaten the stability of political systems and how. While the literature on “cleavages” is 
substantial and diverse,
10
 we regard Nicholas Miller’s systematic reconstruction of the pluralist 
argument particularly clear and helpful as a theoretical foundation because of its focus on causal 
mechanisms. Pluralist theory relates “the pattern of group affiliations and conflict in society with 
patterns of political preferences and in turn relates these preference patterns to the stability of the 
political system, i.e., whether there is widespread acceptance of existing constitutional 
arrangements or whether the political system is threatened by such factors as civil war, revolution, 
separatism, widespread discontent, organized violence, and deep alienation” (Miller 1983: 735). He 
introduced the term “preferences clusters” to denote sets of individuals having (more or less) the 
same policy preferences. The number of preference clusters is higher in societies where different 
political divisions are related to one another in a crosscutting rather than reinforcing pattern. Miller 
specified four mechanisms through which crosscutting preference patterns lead to political stability. 
First, such patterns cause moderate attitudes. In pluralist societies, individuals are subject to cross-
pressures that tend to make their attitudes more moderate or less intense. Second, crosscutting 
preference patterns cause moderate behaviour. When preferences are pluralistically distributed, 
"those who are enemies in one situation are sometimes required to act as allies in another situation. 
With an eye on future co-operation, they restrain their behaviour in present competition" (Bailey 
1970, p. 129, cited by Miller (1983, 736). Third, crosscutting preference patterns encourage 
political stratagems. If preferences are pluralistically distributed, then majority preference is 
typically cyclical, and this gives present losers on a particular issue hope to become winners on the 
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 As Lord and Pollak (2013) note, this was achieved by balancing equal representation of indviduals and equal 
representation of states within all main EU bodies, rather than organizing each body only according to one of the two 
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 From the seminal discussion by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to the more recent analyses by Bartolini (2005) and 
Caramani (2015). 
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same issue, if they successfully engage in political manoeuvers such as vote trading, coalition 
building and splitting, agenda manipulation, strategic voting, and patronage. The flux of politics 
prevents temporary losers from desiring a collapse of democratic procedures. Fourth, pluralistic 
preference patterns distribute political satisfaction. “In the absence of a majority preference cluster, 
political outcomes are brought about by shifting coalitions of smaller clusters. Political outcomes 
probably please and displease nobody all the time; rather they please almost everybody some of the 
time. Political satisfaction, although probably nowhere total, is widespread” (Miller 1983, 737). In 
this view, any persistent minorities could be quite large and have both the motive and the resources 
to destabilize the political system.  
While all four causal mechanisms are plausible, we regard the latter as being especially important.  
In any real political system, a sizable proportion of citizens may be obliged to comply with policies 
that they dislike, but the destabilizing effect of this fact increases when the same section of the 
population systematically experiences “political dissatisfaction” (to use Miller’s term) across 
multiple decisions and issues. The key importance of this factor is stressed not only by the classical 
pluralists, but also by the participants in the current debate about increasing competition in EU 
politics. As noted above, Joseph Weiler had cautioned that allowing minorities to be outvoted by 
majorities “may bring about a decline in the social legitimacy of the polity with consequent 
dysfunctions and even disintegration” (Weiler 1993, 23). More recent contributions stress the 
possibility of groups of people being “permanently” and “systematically” outvoted. Hix (2008, 106) 
remarks that “If a section of society feels that it will be permanently on the losing side, the members 
of this group will not only oppose the government of the day but will also start to oppose the 
political system as a whole…”. Similarly, Papadopoulos and Magnette (2010) note that, “in a 
heterogeneous polity like the EU, the problem is how to ensure that a competitive game will not 
generate structural minorities, that is, groups who deny their support because they feel that they are 
systematically losers in political competition.”  
This discussion indicates that an assessment of the potentially destabilizing effects of increased 
political competition in the EU should focus on the problem of persistent minorities in relation to 
policy preferences. Two caveats are in order. First, the classical pluralist literature assumed an 
unproblematic correspondence between social group membership (e.g. economic class or religious 
affiliation) and policy preferences (Miller 1983). Recent research suggests that, at least nowadays, 
the correlation is complex and in some cases fairly weak.
11
 For this reason, in the next section we 
will employ measures that capture political preferences rather than “objective” group affiliations, as 
                                                 
11
Kriesi (1998); De La O and Rodden (2008); Dion and Birchfield (2010); Guillaud (2013); Kitschelt and Rehm (2014). 
 10 
they provide more direct insight into the degree and distribution of dissatisfaction with political 
decisions.   
Second, a focus on existing policy preferences could be criticised with reference to a theory of 
democracy that stresses the potentially transformative effects of democratic processes on 
preferences.
 
Follesdal and Hix (2006, 545), for instance, note that a “key difference between 
standard democratic and non-democratic regimes…is that citizens form their views about which 
policy options they prefer through the processes of deliberation and party contestation that are 
essential elements of all democracies. Because voters’ preferences are shaped by the democratic 
process, a democracy would almost definitely produce outcomes that are different to those produced 
by ‘enlightened’ technocrats.” We are sympathetic to this argument. An adherent of the 
consociational interpretation of the EU, however, may retort that the introduction of further 
competitive/majoritarian elements in the EU would risk compromising its stability before their 
transformative effects on preferences could have a chance to unfold. Therefore, establishing 
whether the distribution of “untransformed” preferences are problematic for stability or not remains 
an important task. 
Having stressed the crucial issue of persistent minorities, we now need to specify under which 
conditions they are more likely to emerge. We derive from literature on pluralism and 
consociationalism three main influences: first, the degree of preference heterogeneity in a 
population; second, the degree of polarization of policy preferences; third, the extent to which 
divisions regarding policy preferences are crosscutting rather than reinforcing. We see these three 
factors as related in an interactive rather than additive way. The link between polarization and 
crosscuttingness is especially important. When policy preferences on individual issues are not 
polarized, democratic satisfaction is likely to be widespread even at low levels of crosscuttingness. 
The more preferences on individual issues are polarized, the more high crosscuttingness is 
necessary to ensure that democratic statisfaction is widespread. The problem of highly unequal 
democratic satisfaction and persistent minorities is severe when polarization is high and 
crosscuttingness is low.   
As noted above, our aim is to assess the contention that the EU polity encompasses a population 
that is highly diverse with regard to politically relevant values and policy preferences (“proposition 
A”). But how can we tell whether the heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of 
preferences are low or high in the EU as a whole? Earlier we referred to Hix’s point that economic 
and political values are on average more similar within Europe than they are between EU and non-
EU countries (Hix 2008, 22). But this does not necessarily mean they are similar enough to prevent 
the destabilizing effects of increased political competition. An additional point of reference and 
 11 
comparison is required. We argue that the degree of heterogeneity, polarization and 
crosscuttingness of the EU as a whole are best compared with that of its member states, both 
because these member states are good examples of political stability and because the “performance” 
of the EU is, explicitly or implicitly, regularly compared to that of the established democracies that 
compose it. The question that we address in the remainder of this paper is therefore: How do the 
levels of heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of preferences in the EU population as a 
whole compare to the levels in the population of individual member states? In addition, we compare 
the structure of policy preferences in the EU population with that of another large and complex 
polity, the United States.  
 
Measurement strategies and data 
In this section we explain why we focus on public opinion, what dimensions we measure, how we 
construct the measurements, and which data we employ. First, we focus on the public policy 
preferences of European citizens as captured by opinion polls. Some studies use socio-demographic 
indicators such as religious affiliation, language and ethnicity as proxies for preference 
heterogeneity and, more recently, for crosscuttingness.
12
 Given our research question, we find it 
more useful to try to capture directly citizens’ preferences over public policies. While opinion 
surveys display a number of well-known limitations, they are still a useful approach for uncovering 
broad patterns in what people want from public authorities. Certainly they are preferable to socio-
demographic indicators that assume relative preference homogeneity amongst all members of a 
certain religious, linguistic, socio-economic, or other group. While heterogeneity and polarization 
have often been studied with opinion data, this paper is the first, to our knowledge, to quantify 
crosscuttingness with survey responses.  
Second, we must determine which preferences matter for the majoritarian-consociational debate. In 
order to identify the most relevant policy dimensions for our analysis, we rely on a sizeable corpus 
of research on the dimensionality of politics in EU institutions and parties (e.g. Marks and 
Steenbergen (2004)). The attention of researchers has focused on three main dimensions. First, there 
is an economic left-right dimension, which concerns issues such as the relationship between 
governments and markets and the redistribution of income and other resources across economic 
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(2011a); Finseraas and Jakobsson (2012). 
 12 
strata. Second, there is a cultural dimension that pits libertarian against traditionalist positions (or 
Green-Alternative-Libertarian against Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist, to use the GAL/TAN 
labels from Hooghe and Marks (2009)). Third, there is the question of European integration itself, 
or more specifically, how policy-making competences should be distributed between the national 
and the European levels of governance.
13
 There are lively debates in the literature on whether 
positions on the economic and cultural dimensions are so highly correlated that in practice they 
amount to a single left-right dimension, and on whether positions on European integration are 
simply a reflection of GAL/TAN cleavages (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Including European 
integration as a distinct dimension of contestation allows us to address the emerging literature on 
EU politicization (De Wilde and Zürn 2012) and assess the concern by Bartolini (2006) that the EU-
level politicization of such “constitutive” issues would intensify conflicts along national rather than 
partisan lines, with detrimental effects on the EU’s stability. Factor analysis and principal 
component analysis of the data we use confirm that the specific survey questions used in this study 
form these three groups, and correspond to the dimensions identified in the literature.
14
  
We must also consider dimensions that are within the current competences of the EU or could 
conceivably come under the purview of the EU in the future. The economic, cultural, and 
integration dimensions selected meet this criterion.
15
 We focus on policies that would apply to all 
member states in a similar way, and we deliberately ignore one issue that raises special questions 
that we cannot address here because of data limitations: economic redistribution across countries.
16
  
Third, we must decide how to measure the key concepts in the majoritarian-consociationalist 
debate. In the previous section we stated that an appropriate assessment of the diversity of the EU 
needs to take into account three factors: heterogeneity, polarization and crosscuttingness of 
preferences. There are various options for operationalizing these variables, none of which is 
obviously more appropriate than the others. 
Heterogeneity refers simply to the extent to which views are distributed across a population, 
without reference to the “shape” of that distribution. To measure the heterogeneity of views on 
                                                 
13
 Including European integration as a distinct dimension of contestation allows us to take into account 
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individual policy issues, we use the Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index ranges between 1/n and 
1 (for large sample sizes like ours, effectively 0-1); to ensure that higher numbers reflect higher 
degrees of heterogeneity, we subtract it from unity. Our measure of heterogeneity for each 
individual question is therefore:  





where Yk is the proportion of the population giving a certain response to the question, and p is the 
number of responses for the question.  
We also consider a measure of heterogeneity that aggregates across questions. Here we employ 
Lieberson’s (1969) 𝐴𝑤, often used for public opinion data, which subtracts the Herfindahl measure 
from unity and allows for the possibility  of combining various dimensions. The formula is:  








Where Aw is the heterogeneity in population w, Yk is the proportion of the population falling in a 
given category within each of the questions, V is the number of questions, and p represents the total 
number of categories k possible for all the questions (Lieberson 1969). Larger values indicate more 
heterogeneity.  
Polarization must capture not only how distributed preferences are across a population, but the 
extent to which preferences cluster at opposite ends of a given dimension. Lindqvist and Östling 
(2010, 563) provide a helpful discussion of alternative ways of measuring polarization, understood 
as the level of ‘social dissensus’ in a country (Bartels 2013).  They compare the standard deviation, 
the measure developed by Esteban and Ray (1994), and a simple measure of bipolarization, the 
proportion of respondents that select the highest and lowest values, finding significant correlation 
across these dimensions. The dimensions we consider tend to follow relatively normal distributions 
(see below), with most Europeans clustered toward the center. We are interested in comparing the 
degree of bipolarity in the EU with that of its member states, and employ the standard deviation and 
Lindqvist and Östling’s simple measure of bipolarization because they are transparent and easily 
interpreted.  
Crosscuttingness is the most nuanced of the concepts we examine. While long discussed in the 
pluralist literature, the concept’s empirical meaning was first developed by Douglas Rae and 
Michael Taylor (Rae and Taylor 1970). They explain the idea as follows:  
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“If…all those who held a particular religion were also in the same class (and vice-versa) so 
that the two sets of groups…were considered identical, then the two cleavages are said to 
“reinforce” each other. If, however, some of those who were of a particular religion were 
divided among several social classes, then we say that the two cleavages “cross-cut” each 
other. Cross-cutting, then, is the extent to which individuals who are in the same group on 
one cleavage are in different groups on the other cleavage” (Rae and Taylor 1970, 82).  
We capture capture crosscuttingness through a measure of statistical association, which indicate the 
extent to which membership in a category on one dimension can be predicted from membership in a 
category on another dimension (Selway (2011b). Specifically, we employ Goodman and Kruskal’s 





where 𝑃𝑠 is the probability that a randomly selected pair of observations will place in the same order 
and 𝑃𝑑  is the probability that a random pair will have a different order (Goodman and Kruskal 
1954). Gamma varies from [-1, 1], with -1 indicating perfect divergence, 1 indicating perfect 
convergence, and 0 indicating no association. Because we are not concerned with the direction of 
association, just whether the dimensions are crosscutting or reinforcing, we obtain our measure of 
crosscuttingness by subtracting the absolute value of gamma from unity: 
𝑋𝐶 = 1 −  |𝛾| 
To our knowledge the present paper is the first to operationalize crosscuttingness with reference to 
policy preferences using public opinion data.
17
 
Fourth, we must decide which data to employ. Our goals set significant constraints on the survey 
questions that we can use. First, the surveys need to have sufficient coverage, i.e. they need to 
encompass either all EU member states or a substantial proportion of them. Second, to measure 
crosscuttingness we need to know how the same individuals responded to questions on at least two, 
and ideally more, distinct policy dimensions. In other words, different surveys cannot be aggregated 
without committing an ecological fallacy. Third, an additional constraint posed by the need to 
measure polarization is that we need to have at least three, and ideally more, relevant response 
categories for each question, otherwise the concept would be undistinguishable from heterogeneity. 
Fourth, and most difficultly, we need to select questions that maximize comparability across diverse 
                                                 
17
 See Web-Appendix B for a discussion of alternative approaches to measuring cross-cuttingness and an 
explanation of our choice. 
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national contexts. Respondents may describe their policy preferences relative to what they perceive 
to be the average preference in their country, and/or the policy status quo there, making it difficult 
to aggregate responses across Europe. For example, respondents who identify as progressive in a 
relatively conservative country may not be as “objectively” progressive as respondents who answer 
the same way in a relatively progressive country. While some degree of context “anchoring” is 
inherent in all survey data, we aim to minimize reliance on explicitly relativist questions (e.g. “Do 
you prefer more or less public spending on X”) or those that refer to national contexts. 
Unfortunately, many of the questions in the datasets with the broadest country coverage are of this 
nature. We therefore employ less relativist question from datasets with smaller coverage as well, to 
make sure that national anchoring is not driving our results. With these considerations in mind, we 
rely principally on the European Electoral Survey (EES), though each calculation has also been 
carried on similar questions from the European Values Survey (EVS) and International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) to ensure the robustness of our findings. Table 1 summarizes the survey 
information. Our measures for the EU as a whole draw on the responses for all EU countries, with 
each country’s contribution weighted by its population.18  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
For the EES data, four economic questions are assessed individually and, together, form our 
composite economic left-right measure: we call them STATE-MARKET 1, STATE-MARKET 2, STATE-
MARKET 3, INCOME EQUALITY 1.
 19
  Similarly, we use six EES cultural questions, which we call 
MULTICULTURALISM 1, MARRIAGE, ABORTION, CIVIL LIBERTIES 1, AUTHORITY, AND GENDER, and a 
single measure for integration, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1. Since averaging multiple survey items 
greatly reduces measurement error and reveals coherence in voter preferences (Ansolabehere et al. 
2008) we use simple averages of the key questions (re-orienting them as appropriate) to create 
measures of our composite dimensions. The alternative approach of esitimating factor scores makes 
little difference to the results reported below. Drawing on the other two surveys, we use five 
questions that capture the economic left-right dimension (we labelled them INCOME EQUALITY 2, 
                                                 
18
 While weighting country responses by population provides the most accurate measure of the distribution 
of preferences in the EU as a whole, the results are largely similar with no weighting. Unweighted measures 
for the EU are included in the appendix tables as well, for reference.  
19
 The wording of all survey questions used in this paper is presented in Web-Appendix C. 
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INCOME EQUALITY 3, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 1, ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2, and STATE-MARKET 
4), four questions that capture the cultural libertarian-traditionalist dimension (MULTICULTURALISM 
2, ENVIRONMENT 1, ENVIRONMENT 2 and CIVIL LIBERTIES 2), and one question on the pro-/anti-
integration dimension (EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2).  
 
Findings 
Heterogeneity. The application of our heterogeneity measure to the EES data for the 28 member 
states and the EU as a whole shows that the EU is more heterogeneous than most, but not all, 
member states.
20
 On the aggregate economic measure it is the 5
th
 most heterogenous polity; on the 
cultural dimension, it is 4
th
. Using Lieberson’s Aw, which we calculate using all the EES questions, 
it is third. But, strikingly, it is not much more heterogeneous than many member states, falling well 
within the range of European countries, albeit in the upper range of the group.  
We find similar results in the EVS and ISSP data.
21
 For the former, the EU’s Aw score makes it the 
8
th
 most heterogenous polity. Moreover, we find little support for regional clustering within the EU. 
Instead, the EU as a whole is never more heterogenous than the most heterogeneous subregion 
(northern, southern, and eastern regions), and is often less.
22
 The ISSP data also allow us to 
compare EU states and the EU as a whole to another large, diverse democratic polity with 
significant contestation over the power of the central government versus the component 
governments: the United States of America. Interestingly, the US is more heterogeneous than the 
EU on two of the four dimensions we measure (CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 AND ENVIRONMENT 2).  
 
Polarization 
Our measurements of polarization tell a similar story. For each dimension, we calculate both the 
standard deviation within each country and for the EU as a whole, as well as the proportion of 
responses that fall in either the highest or lowest category (i.e. 1 or 10, or 1 or 4). Measured either 
way, the EU’s polarization relative to member states is remarkably consistent across dimensions, 
                                                 
20
 See Web-Appendix D, Table D1, for the heterogeneity values of all member states and the EU in relation 
to the EES questions. 
21
 See Web-Appendix D, Tables D2 and D3, respectively. 
22
 See Web-Appendix E for an analysis of heterogeneity in the three EU subregions. 
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falling around the middle of the group.
 23
 It is no more or less polarized than the average EU state. 
When compared to various regional groupings, the EU looks similarly reassuring. For all 
dimensions, there is always at least one regional cluster of EU members that is more polarized than 
the EU as a whole.  
These findings are corroborated by data from the EVS and ISSP, using the same measures of 
standard deviation and bipolarization.
24
 By these measures the EU is slightly more polarized, on 
average, than the EU states polled, but well within the range of EU states. It also tends to be less 
polarized than the United States.  
 
Crosscuttingness  
Finally, we turn to crosscuttingness. Even though the EU is not particularly heterogenous or 
polarized compared to the average EU member state, we might be worried about majoritarian 
procedures if we found Europe-wide cleavages to reinforce one another. Instead, we find that they 
are crosscutting. Using the aggregate dimensions from the EES data, we examined how the EU 
compares to member states with respect to crosscuttingness on pairs of policy issues (ECONOMIC X 
CULTURE, ECONOMIC X EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1, CULTURE X EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1)
25
. The EU 
tends to be more crosscutting than the average European country; for the latter two pairings, it is the 
most crosscut polity, and for the first it scores toward the middle of the distribution. This trend 
appears even more strongly in the EVS and ISSP data, with the EU consistenly appearing toward 
the top of the distribution.
26
 Interestingly, from the ISSP data we find that this puts it at almost the 
same position as the United States in terms of crosscuttingness.  
 
What prospect for permanent minorities? 
Above we argued that the risk of permanent minorities is particularly high when heterogeneity and 
polarization are high and crosscuttingness is low. Our results show that the EU as a whole does not 
have such risky combinations of heterogeneity/polarization and crosscuttingness, and they can be 
                                                 
23
 See Web-Appendix D, Tables D4 and D5, for polarization values in relation to the EES questions. 
24
 See Web-Appendix D, Table D6 and D7, for polarization values in relation to the EVS and ISSP 
questions. 
25
 See Web-Appendix D, Table D8, for crosscuttingness values in relation to the EES questions. 
26
 See Web-Appendix D, Table D9 and Table D10, for crosscuttingness values in relation to the EVS and 
ISSP questions. 
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summarized most succinctly in Figures 1 and 2, which show three scatterplots each comparing 
crosscuttingness and polarization. Member states and the EU itself are plotted with EES measures 





FIGURES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We would be most concerned about democracy in the lower right portion of the plots, where 
polarization is high and crosscuttingness is low. This creates a strong possibility of permanent 
minorities. In contrast, the upper left portion of the plots is the safest location for democracies, 
where crosscuttingness is high and polarization low.  
The results are striking. While the EU sits toward the middle of the distribution in terms of 
polarization, it tends to come at or near the top in measures of crosscuttingness. This keeps it 
decisively out of the lower right quadrant and, more relevantly, comfortably to the northwest of 
many of its member states.  We conclude that citizens are not subject to a higher risk of falling into 
a persistent minority under a more competitive EU government than they are in their own country.   
While it is beyond the scope of this article to explain why policy preferences across European states 
and the continent as a whole distribute as they do, the findings suggest a higher degree of 
convergence than many observers assume, consistent with growing research on the development of 
European party systems. The array of factors that, in the analysis of Caramani (2015), produced a 
remarkable convergence of elections and party systems across Europe - shared historical 
experiences such as the National and Industrial revolutions, supranational forces like European 
institutional integration, and the transnational diffusion of ideas and norms – have probably played  
an analogous role in shaping  the political beliefs and policy preferences of its citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis of the policy preferences of European citizens has shown that the EU as a whole is 
slightly more heterogeneous and polarized than the average member state, although several member 
states are more heterogeneous and polarized than the EU polity. Differences in views on public 
                                                 
27
 The three measures of bipolarization are from Table D4 and the three measures of crosscuttingness  are 
from Table D8 in Web-Appendix D. Figure D1 in Web-Appendix D replicates this analysis with EVS data. 
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issues are significantly more crosscutting in the EU polity than in the average member state. 
Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarized, and nearly as 
crosscutting, in the EU as a whole than in the United States. 
These findings have important implications for the debate on increasing the level of democratic 
contestation in EU politics. The consociational interpretation of the EU suggests that such an 
increase would be dangerous, as the divided nature of European society means that substantial 
groups of the EU population may be locked in the position of a persistent minority. Our analysis 
shows this risk to be low. Polarization on individual policy issues leads to skewed and systematic 
dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the democratic process only when cleavages are reinforcing 
rather than crosscutting – in other words, if people are systematically outvoted on a range of policy 
issues they care about, rather than being sometimes on the winning and sometimes on the losing 
side. The relatively high level of crosscuttingness in the EU polity makes the adverse scenario 
unlikely. 
Our findings should assuage concerns about the existence of persistent minorities if EU politics 
becomes more democratically competitive than it is at the moment. To the extent that the structure 
of policy preferences matter, European citizens seem ready for more democracy in the European 
Union. But we should also note two issues that our analysis has not addressed and that would be 
important topics for further research. First, satisfaction with policy decisions is not all that matters 
in politics, and thus democratic stability would not be guaranteed in a more competitive system. 
Here we focused on satisfaction and dissatisfaction with policy decisions, including decisions that 
distribute policy-making competencies between the national and European level, but not satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction with who ultimately has the right to decide, as opposed to what is decided. To 
illustrate this difference with a stark example, a citizen may face two scenarios: (a) a policy change 
she supports is adopted by an EU-wide majority against the wishes of a majority in her own state; 
(b) the policy change that she and an EU-wide majority supports is successfully vetoed by a 
majority of her own co-nationals. It is conceivable that the citizen in question might favour scenario 
(b), i.e. she would rather see her preferred policy defeated than imposed on a majority of her co-
nationals by a transnational majority that includes herself. How many citizens would make that 
choice in today’s Europe is a matter of speculation. What can be said is that, if such an orientation 
was widespread, then it would raise concerns about the strengthening of the competitive elements of 
EU politics beyond the distribution of policy preferences that are the focus of this paper. 
Second, as we noted in  the introduction, we are not pointing at the pattern of policy preferences in 
the EU as an argument for strengthening the competitive elements in EU politics, but in order 
critically question the empirical assumptions of an argument against it. A positive endorsement of 
 20 
increasing contestation still depends on whether we are convinced by the philosophical argument by  
Follesdal, Hix and others that political contestation is essential to democracy or that, in the words of 
Norberto Bobbio (1987, 25), democracy requires that ‘those called upon to take decisions, or to 
elect those who are to take decisions, must be offered real alternatives’. 
While these scope conditions suggest avenues for futher research, the paper’s central findings put in 
question a core assumption of many scholarly and popular observers who see the European polity as 
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WEB-APPENDIX A: SELECTING THE DIMENSIONS OF INTEREST 
 
A large body of literature has explored the dimensions along which political opinion cleaves. Following 
Rovny and Marks,
29
 we selected our principal dimensions of interests largely from theoretical considerations 
and from common findings in the existing literature. To then confirm our selection of economic, cultural, 
and integration dimensions as the primary cleavages of interest, we performed factor analysis and principal 
component analysis on the items from the European Election Survey (EES) and the European Value Survey 
(EVS) that we use in this paper (see Web-Appendix C for details on those items and the labels we use for 
them). The results, reported below, provide support for this approach.  
In the EES data (which combines four economic questions, six cultural ones, and one integration question) 
factor analysis yields a single dimension (roughly Left-Right) over the threshold for rejection (eigenvalue 
1.54, accounting for 67% of the variance). Principal component analysis, instead, yields four, although one 
                                                 
29
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of these is quite weak (0.002 above the threshold for rejection). The other three correspond nicely to the 
economic, cultural, and integration dimensions (table A1). 
 
Table A1. Principal Component Analysis, EES data. 
 ECONOMIC CULTURE INTEGRATION Uniqueness 
EUR. INTEG. 1 0.0296 0.0012 0.9492 0.0981 
MULTICULTURALISM 1 0.6347 0.0063 0.163 0.5704 
STATE-MARKET 1 0.5016 0.1337 -0.1372 0.4325 
MARRIAGE 0.421 0.5638 0.0848 0.4504 
STATE-MARKET 2 0.1411 0.1033 0.0769 0.4407 
ABORTION 0.1717 -0.7985 -0.0262 0.3209 
STATE-MARKET 3 0.4857 -0.0004 0.0226 0.7537 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1 0.6882 -0.0238 0.0565 0.4998 
EQUALITY 1 0.1572 -0.038 -0.1956 0.5439 
AUTHORITY 0.6095 0.0542 -0.0851 0.5956 
GENDER 0.3145 0.5878 -0.1444 0.5081 
 
 The EVS data are even more straightforwardly along the lines we assume (table A2). Because different 
questions were asked in different years, we are able use either ENVIRONMENT 1 or MULTICULTURALISM 2 as 
the “culture” measure, with the three economic measures. For the same reason, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2 is 
only available with MULTICULTURALISM 2, not with ENVIRONMENT 1. Using MULTICULTURALISM 2, the 
three economic measures, and EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2 yields three dimensions above the threshold for 
rejection (eigenvalues > 1) using both factor analysis and principal component analysis. Using 
ENVIRONMENT 1 (instead of MULTICULTURALISM 2) and the three economic measures (and therefore 
dropping EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2) yields two dimensions in both factor and principal component analysis. 
This finding also supports our interpretation, as the integration dimension is not included in this calculation.  
 
Table A2. Principal component analysis, EVS data. 
Variable ECONOMIC INTEGRATION CULTURE Uniqueness 
 
MULTICULTURALISM 2 0.2411 0.2486 0.8545 0.1498 
EQUALITY 2 0.3552 0.653 0.0841 0.4404 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 0.7353 -0.2546 -0.1731 0.3646 
STATE-MARKET 4 0.7628 -0.1419 -0.1393 0.3786 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 2 0.0051 0.7116 -0.4655 0.277 
 
ENVIRONMENT 1 0.1207  -0.7572 0.412 
EQUALITY 2 -0.2572  0.6353 0.5303 
RESPONSIBILITY 1 0.7841  0.0819 0.3784 









WEB-APPENDIX B: APPROACHES TO MEASURING CROSS-CUTTINGNESS 
 
There are two approaches to measuring crosscuttingness. The first approach is to connect crosscuttingness 
between categories to heterogeneity within categories, so that crosscuttingness is necessarily lower at higher 
levels of heterogeneity. This is the approach chosen by Rae and Taylor, who render the concept of 
crosscuttingness mathematically as: 










𝑖  is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a dimension with i categories, 
∑ 𝑝𝑗
2
𝑗  is the sum of the proportion of individuals in each category of a second dimension with categories j, 
and ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
2
𝑖,𝑗  is the sum of the proportion of individuals at all possible combinations of the two dimensions, 
𝑖 ×  𝑗 . The concept can be rendered as a contingency table that assigns observations to dimension one in i 
columns and dimension two in j rows. Crosscuttingness is then just as the sum of the proportion in each row 
plus the sum of the proportion in each column, minus twice the sum of the proportion in each cell.  
The alternative approach is to capture crosscuttingness through measures of statistical association, which 
indicate the extent to which membership in a category on one dimension can be predicted from membership 
in a category on another dimension, irrespective of how heterogeneous the dimensions are. This is the 
approach chosen by Joel Selway (2011b), who has recently reintroduced the concept of crosscuttingess in 
the comparative politics literature in order to understand the effects of linguistic and ethnic cleavages on 
civil war. Selway employs the standard chi-square test that measures the independence of two variables. To 
ensure comparability across dimensions that may have different numbers of categories, Selway uses 
Kramer’s V, which normalizes the 𝜒2 statistic by the product of the categories of the two dimensions under 
consideration.  
Since we find it useful to keep a clear conceptual distinction between heterogeneity and crosscuttingess, we 
adopt an approach similar to Selway’s. But because we are concerned with the crosscuttingness of policy 
preferences as ordinal variables, not discrete linguistic or ethnic groups, Kramer’s V is not appropriate 





where 𝑃𝑠 is the probability that a randomly selected pair of observations will place in the same order and 𝑃𝑑 
is the probability that a random pair will have a different order (Goodman and Kruskal 1954). Gamma varies 
from [-1, 1], with -1 indicating perfect divergence, 1 indicating perfect convergence, and 0 indicating no 
association. Because we are not concerned with the direction of association, just whether the dimensions are 
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crosscutting or reinforcing, we obtain our measure of crosscuttingness by subtracting the absolute value of 
gamma from unity: 
𝑋𝐶 = 1 −  |𝛾| 
Note that gamma is sensitive to the number of categories within each dimension, meaning that our measure 
of crosscuttingness will not be directly comparable across dimensions that have different numbers of 
categories (Rae and Taylor 1970, 84). Happily, working with public opinion data allows us to elide this 
limitation, because we can select questions that have the same number of possible responses, allowing 
crosscuttingness to be compared directly. We believe the present paper is the first to operationalize 





WEB-APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
Table C1. Overview of survey questions used in the paper  
Our label Question Response categories Source and 
question 
code 
INCOME EQUALITY 1 
 
Income and wealth should be 
redistributed towards ordinary people 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 




INCOME EQUALITY 2 
 
On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this 
scale? 
 




10 we need larger income 
differences as incentives 
EVS [e035] 
INCOME EQUALITY 3 
 
On the whole, do you think it should or 
should not be the government's 
responsibility to reduce income 
differences between the rich and the 
poor? 
1 Definitely should be 
2 Probably should be 
3 Probably should not be 






On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this 
scale? 
1 Individuals should take more 




10 The state should take more 
responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for 




On the whole, do you think it should or 
should not be the government's 
responsibility to provide a job for 
everyone who wants one? 
1 Definitely should be 
2 Probably should be 
3 Probably should not be 





Private enterprise is the best way to 
solve COUNTRY NAME’s economic 
problems 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 




Major public services and industries 
ought to be in state ownership. 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 




Politics should abstain from intervening 
in the economy 






5 strongly disagree 
STATE-MARKET 4 
 
On this card you see a number of 
opposite views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this 
scale? 
 
1 the state should give more 
freedom to firms 
↑ 
↓ 






Immigrants should be required to 
adapt to the customs of COUNTRY 
NAME. 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 





Which of these statements is the nearest 
to your opinion? 
 
 
1 for the greater good of society it 
is better if immigrants maintain 




10 for the greater good of society 
it is better if immigrants do not 
maintain their distinct customs 
and traditions but adopt the 




I would agree to an increase in taxes if 
the extra money is used to prevent 
environmental pollution. 
1 strongly agree 
2 agree 
3 disagree 




On the whole, do you think it should or 
should not be the government's 
responsibility to impose strict laws to 
make industry do less damage to the 
environment? 
1 Definitely should be 
2 Probably should be 
3 Probably should not be 
4 Definitely should not be 
ISSP 
[V34/7j] 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 1 
 
People who break the law should be 
given much harsher sentences than 
they are these days. 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 
5 strongly disagree 
EES [q62] 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 
 
Suppose the government suspected that 
a terrorist act was about to happen. Do 
you think the authorities should have 
the right to detain people for as long as 
they want without putting them on trial? 
1 Definitely should have right 
2 Probably should have right 
3 Probably should not have right 






Some say European unification should 
be pushed further. Others say it already 
has gone too far. What is your 
opinion? Please indicate your views 
using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 
means unification ‘has already 







gone too far’ and 10 means it ‘should 
be pushed further’. What number on 
this scale best describes your 
position? 





Some people may have fears about the 
building of the European Union. I am 
going to read a number of things which 
people say they are afraid of. For each 
tell me if you - personally - are 
currently afraid of: 
The loss of national identity and culture 
1 very much afraid 
↑ 
↓ 
10 not afraid at all 
EVS [g047] 
MARRIAGE Same‐ sex marriages should be 
prohibited by law. 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 
5 strongly disagree 
EES [q58] 
ABORTION Women should be free to decide on 
matters of abortion 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 
5 strongly disagree 
EES [q60] 
AUTHORITY Schools must teach children to obey 
authority. 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 
5 strongly disagree 
EES [q64] 
GENDER A woman should be prepared to cut 
down on her paid work for the sake of 
her family. 
1 strongly agree 
↑ 
↓ 




WEB-APPENDIX D: VALUES OF PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY, POLARIZATION AND CROSSCUTTINGNESS 
Table D1. Preference heterogeneity in the EU as a whole compared to member states. EES data 
 S-M1 S-M2 S-M3 EQ. 1 ECON GENDER MULTI 1 MARR. CIV 1 AUTH. ABORT. CULTURE EUR. 1 AW 
Austria 0.767 0.758 0.751 0.774 0.693 0.782 0.715 0.757 0.774 0.783 0.643 0.702 0.844 0.749 
Belgium 0.740 0.780 0.763 0.725 0.667 0.790 0.734 0.785 0.732 0.693 0.703 0.676 0.860 0.742 
Bulgaria 0.767 0.738 0.756 0.703 0.689 0.781 0.694 0.739 0.423 0.406 0.641 0.654 0.838 0.679 
Cyprus 0.732 0.756 0.749 0.710 0.648 0.648 0.681 0.760 0.652 0.552 0.727 0.583 0.827 0.694 
Czech Rep. 0.770 0.769 0.754 0.787 0.670 0.775 0.602 0.780 0.633 0.595 0.612 0.593 0.872 0.709 
Denmark 0.751 0.708 0.712 0.745 0.675 0.639 0.759 0.589 0.776 0.688 0.525 0.633 0.844 0.696 
Estonia 0.702 0.678 0.742 0.782 0.633 0.739 0.634 0.733 0.643 0.693 0.599 0.647 0.865 0.699 
Finland 0.714 0.764 0.733 0.698 0.664 0.721 0.584 0.764 0.682 0.601 0.614 0.626 0.828 0.692 
France 0.762 0.772 0.699 0.704 0.700 0.771 0.710 0.731 0.771 0.694 0.478 0.716 0.851 0.720 
Germany 0.728 0.662 0.730 0.756 0.676 0.744 0.698 0.711 0.736 0.740 0.645 0.668 0.860 0.719 
Greece 0.765 0.768 0.729 0.636 0.669 0.665 0.730 0.779 0.686 0.661 0.668 0.702 0.851 0.716 
Hungary 0.741 0.638 0.748 0.718 0.641 0.777 0.567 0.750 0.491 0.486 0.592 0.624 0.873 0.665 
Ireland 0.736 0.770 0.756 0.706 0.679 0.728 0.731 0.765 0.621 0.630 0.674 0.666 0.812 0.713 
Italy 0.747 0.778 0.765 0.707 0.657 0.738 0.692 0.792 0.630 0.706 0.643 0.675 0.839 0.721 
Latvia 0.728 0.723 0.762 0.729 0.674 0.753 0.701 0.661 0.676 0.783 0.614 0.667 0.865 0.718 
Lithuania 0.694 0.665 0.749 0.704 0.646 0.757 0.607 0.719 0.668 0.745 0.646 0.655 0.860 0.701 
Lux. 0.736 0.733 0.701 0.746 0.657 0.773 0.668 0.702 0.762 0.725 0.628 0.646 0.869 0.719 
Malta 0.715 0.748 0.700 0.600 0.687 0.628 0.663 0.767 0.689 0.558 0.753 0.662 0.826 0.692 
Netherlands 0.700 0.699 0.574 0.655 0.616 0.653 0.658 0.598 0.686 0.605 0.585 0.571 0.864 0.651 
Poland 0.749 0.754 0.765 0.776 0.681 0.772 0.689 0.706 0.632 0.696 0.741 0.687 0.836 0.730 
Portugal 0.669 0.737 0.711 0.686 0.658 0.604 0.613 0.791 0.593 0.553 0.672 0.593 0.818 0.669 
Romania 0.776 0.689 0.744 0.786 0.710 0.696 0.701 0.620 0.561 0.518 0.625 0.620 0.796 0.680 
Slovakia 0.764 0.726 0.782 0.790 0.678 0.776 0.662 0.778 0.633 0.701 0.633 0.654 0.853 0.725 
Slovenia 0.713 0.729 0.720 0.596 0.612 0.688 0.653 0.777 0.562 0.636 0.598 0.603 0.839 0.671 
Spain 0.744 0.713 0.696 0.657 0.663 0.720 0.622 0.702 0.645 0.621 0.683 0.625 0.843 0.687 
Sweden 0.753 0.789 0.747 0.792 0.702 0.630 0.764 0.606 0.768 0.786 0.470 0.679 0.842 0.718 
UK 0.762 0.780 0.767 0.746 0.709 0.753 0.577 0.752 0.562 0.515 0.548 0.674 0.825 0.690 
Country average 0.738 0.734 0.733 0.719 0.669 0.722 0.671 0.726 0.655 0.643 0.628 0.648 0.844 0.702 
































Table D2. Preference heterogeneity in the EU as a whole compared to member states. EVS data 
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 Data from Cyprus are not available for this question.  
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Austria 0.820 0.847 0.867 0.864 0.696 0.868 0.866 
Belgium 0.884 0.878 0.873 0.857 0.724 0.893 0.874 
Bulgaria 0.817 0.881 0.865 0.859 0.699 0.835 0.853 
Croatia 0.865 0.885 0.867 0.881 0.666 0.865 0.871 
Cyprus 0.875 0.870 0.871 0.829 . 0.864 0.855 
Czech Rep. 0.887 0.885 0.889 0.888 0.595 0.894 0.890 
Denmark 0.861 0.853 0.842 0.851 0.696 0.886 0.860 
Estonia 0.888 0.887 0.880 0.883 0.619 0.893 0.885 
Finland 0.885 0.878 0.870 0.870 0.665 0.887 0.876 
France 0.890 0.875 0.883 0.872 0.713 0.878 0.878 
Germany 0.864 0.878 0.892 0.888 0.667 0.894 0.891 
Greece 0.880 0.894 0.878 0.871 0.674 0.880 0.876 
Hungary 0.876 0.875 0.865 0.881 0.706 0.878 0.875 
Ireland 0.891 0.875 0.863 0.891 0.648 0.858 0.871 
Italy 0.890 0.886 0.889 0.884 0.656 0.887 0.887 
Latvia 0.872 0.891 0.884 0.890 0.655 0.891 0.888 
Lithuania 0.886 0.881 0.889 0.889 0.594 0.889 0.889 
Luxembourg 0.882 0.863 0.876 0.872 0.705 0.884 0.877 
Malta 0.861 0.873 0.879 0.857 0.618 0.868 0.868 
Netherlands 0.862 0.870 0.867 0.862 0.640 0.888 0.872 
Poland 0.892 0.885 0.887 0.876 0.699 0.880 0.881 
Portugal 0.889 0.869 0.870 0.816 0.649 0.884 0.857 
Romania 0.798 0.821 0.866 0.852 0.719 0.861 0.860 
Slovakia 0.891 0.886 0.884 0.890 0.705 0.888 0.887 
Slovenia 0.847 0.888 0.889 0.879 0.609 0.872 0.880 
Spain 0.884 0.869 0.866 0.857 0.664 0.885 0.869 
Sweden 0.882 0.870 0.868 0.867 0.655 0.890 0.875 
UK 0.884 0.856 0.856 0.876 0.652 0.813 0.848 
        
Average 0.872 0.874 0.874 0.870 0.642 0.877 0.874 
EU 0.891 0.884 0.884 0.882 0.694 0.887 0.884 
EU’s rank 2nd (tie) 10th 9th 9th 11th 10th (tie) 8th 
        
Pre-2000 EU 0.890 0.882 0.882 0.878 0.692 0.883 0.881 
Post-2000 EU 0.888 0.887 0.888 0.883 0.701 0.883 0.885 
East 0.888 0.887 0.888 0.883 0.700 0.224 0.665 
North 0.888 0.872 0.875 0.876 0.705 0.874 0.875 












Czech Republic 0.735 0.664 0.721 0.588 
Denmark 0.742 0.716 0.738 0.469 
Finland 0.665 0.735 0.731 0.588 
France 0.639 0.734 0.747 0.410 
Germany 0.689 0.701 0.744 0.554 
Hungary 0.609 0.574 0.732 0.531 
Ireland 0.654 0.723 0.742 0.495 
Latvia 0.633 0.635 0.689 0.573 
Netherlands 0.693 0.727 0.735 0.616 
Poland 0.585 0.560 0.716 0.514 
Portugal 0.521 0.614 0.715 0.490 
Slovenia 0.566 0.598 0.735 0.487 
Spain 0.607 0.645 0.749 0.490 
Sweden 0.708 0.730 0.724 0.591 
United Kingdom 0.699 0.714 0.715 0.575 
     
Country average 0.650 0.671 0.729 0.531 










     
USA 0.747 0.732 0.747 0.514 
 
Unweighted  0.893 0.885 0.887 0.886 0.696 0.890 0.888 
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Table D4. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, bipolarization measure, EES data 
 S-M1 S-M2 S-M3 EQ. 1 ECON GENDER MULTI 1 MARR. CIV 1 AUTH. ABORT. CULTURE EUR. 1 
Austria 22.27 22.66 21.78 26.01 15.60 28.73 39.43 40.98 29.08 29.64 45.29 14.80 13.98 
Belgium 17.57 25.62 24.95 29.39 22.26 34.60 38.30 41.75 34.03 38.89 43.54 15.47 16.23 
Bulgaria 25.06 35.01 34.67 40.74 19.40 28.48 38.07 49.78 72.57 74.41 46.66 20.80 21.52 
Cyprus 22.43 23.98 24.58 31.74 13.70 41.70 40.55 38.09 44.26 57.01 32.41 12.60 31.75 
Czech Rep. 23.01 28.98 23.35 29.77 14.12 25.80 50.79 32.13 47.61 52.97 54.37 8.43 15.20 
Denmark 16.93 26.13 23.61 16.46 19.30 42.01 29.02 55.61 30.67 23.05 59.64 12.30 9.86 
Estonia 21.69 41.10 32.05 26.97 15.79 20.92 43.15 42.01 45.71 34.58 42.83 15.59 17.75 
Finland 16.68 26.06 25.62 31.31 13.40 33.13 46.98 45.22 35.08 45.47 50.76 10.40 5.77 
France 30.34 39.71 40.76 37.27 22.50 45.10 45.02 57.42 39.96 49.75 70.78 15.40 18.86 
Germany 19.07 22.94 15.09 22.42 11.85 20.72 32.43 31.41 27.28 20.60 39.23 10.76 14.90 
Greece 30.36 34.73 31.19 43.83 15.80 42.77 42.79 40.65 48.24 47.11 48.07 16.20 25.03 
Hungary 17.50 50.10 33.54 39.26 16.22 25.74 56.61 43.68 67.17 67.30 53.41 13.63 21.04 
Ireland 32.98 36.58 41.53 43.72 15.88 49.79 41.95 44.57 56.78 51.92 52.28 10.29 11.70 
Italy 25.16 26.74 31.15 33.47 18.60 28.94 40.80 39.20 50.36 32.44 44.73 15.00 28.48 
Latvia 18.67 39.66 29.07 37.21 18.58 29.73 39.92 53.11 39.98 29.69 45.79 16.78 21.71 
Lithuania 18.33 29.83 20.48 25.65 24.30 19.08 35.32 43.46 35.65 22.74 37.39 18.90 23.37 
Lux. 18.44 29.78 23.31 19.60 14.99 29.23 36.80 44.55 27.43 29.47 50.76 11.59 12.15 
Malta 27.71 25.17 33.71 22.63 33.80 25.97 42.41 34.68 30.19 41.39 38.62 25.20 27.76 
Netherlands 7.24 17.30 14.08 13.00 10.95 25.30 22.18 38.31 20.16 24.10 32.50 6.27 11.30 
Poland 23.68 33.99 28.33 26.91 18.36 27.86 31.93 52.40 53.50 36.17 45.93 18.66 25.39 
Portugal 13.16 15.74 14.02 19.29 22.30 14.43 15.41 30.67 39.29 32.36 32.45 8.50 18.12 
Romania 28.49 43.48 41.18 37.49 29.51 38.20 33.04 66.04 60.48 61.31 54.54 20.74 41.21 
Slovakia 20.69 35.53 25.52 31.26 21.75 26.84 44.43 47.20 49.65 44.21 54.96 13.88 15.86 
Slovenia 13.99 23.83 28.78 47.88 9.90 39.00 44.32 38.48 57.93 43.79 49.85 8.30 27.84 
Spain 17.84 16.90 17.48 20.48 18.30 18.63 33.97 28.44 40.24 32.09 29.20 8.70 23.21 
Sweden 19.46 33.30 32.33 31.46 17.07 55.65 32.45 64.21 30.70 31.77 71.50 18.66 12.37 
UK 31.49 39.31 38.22 41.38 17.40 49.74 62.95 53.10 67.07 68.37 67.86 10.80 9.69 
Country average 21.49 30.52 27.79 30.61 18.21 32.15 39.30 44.34 43.74 41.58 47.98 14.02 19.34 































Table D5. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, standard deviation measure, EES data 
 S-M1 S-M2 S-M3 EQ. 1 ECON GENDER MULTI 1 MARR. CIV 1 AUTH. ABORT. CULTURE EUR. 1 
Austria 1.17 1.17 1.19 1.26 0.96 1.29 1.14 1.34 1.22 1.31 1.00 0.95 2.39 
Belgium 1.10 1.25 1.24 1.13 0.91 1.37 1.17 1.41 1.13 1.08 1.16 0.97 2.44 
Bulgaria 1.18 1.15 1.19 1.08 0.91 1.26 1.08 1.36 0.63 0.63 0.97 1.13 2.46 
Cyprus 1.13 1.26 1.27 1.12 0.84 0.99 1.07 1.29 0.96 0.78 1.25 0.91 2.73 
Czech Rep. 1.20 1.24 1.16 1.30 0.93 1.24 0.86 1.33 0.88 0.85 0.94 0.83 2.45 
Denmark 1.13 1.09 1.15 1.11 0.94 0.95 1.23 0.94 1.29 1.08 0.75 0.76 2.18 
Estonia 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.27 0.91 1.11 0.93 1.20 0.90 1.04 0.82 1.03 2.56 
Finland 1.09 1.28 1.24 1.05 0.85 1.17 0.79 1.43 1.01 0.85 0.98 0.87 1.99 
France 1.34 1.44 1.19 1.18 0.91 1.45 1.26 1.50 1.33 1.27 0.90 0.97 2.50 
Germany 1.09 1.06 1.13 1.23 0.93 1.22 1.09 1.15 1.14 1.18 0.99 0.88 2.44 
Greece 1.32 1.36 1.34 1.01 0.83 1.10 1.35 1.44 1.17 1.11 1.19 1.05 2.55 
Hungary 1.07 0.92 1.13 1.08 0.77 1.23 0.76 1.32 0.74 0.71 0.83 1.01 2.65 
Ireland 1.22 1.40 1.40 1.23 0.91 1.40 1.33 1.45 1.10 1.07 1.27 0.90 2.11 
Italy 1.17 1.28 1.31 1.07 0.87 1.18 1.08 1.43 0.94 1.08 0.99 1.01 2.66 
Latvia 1.06 1.17 1.22 1.13 0.88 1.19 1.10 1.11 0.93 1.30 0.87 1.03 2.57 
Lithuania 0.98 0.92 1.14 1.01 0.89 1.13 0.85 1.17 0.89 1.18 0.91 1.05 2.62 
Lux. 1.14 1.25 1.12 1.18 0.90 1.32 1.04 1.21 1.19 1.20 1.01 0.87 2.36 
Malta 1.16 1.25 1.21 0.97 0.92 0.97 1.10 1.38 0.99 0.73 1.36 1.22 2.57 
Netherlands 0.99 1.15 0.91 1.00 0.72 1.04 1.01 0.93 1.06 0.93 0.91 0.72 2.20 
Poland 1.14 1.20 1.20 1.24 0.95 1.25 1.09 1.30 1.03 1.08 1.33 1.10 2.37 
Portugal 1.00 1.13 1.10 1.06 0.90 1.00 0.96 1.31 0.77 0.74 1.07 0.83 2.44 
Romania 1.24 1.07 1.29 1.38 1.04 1.06 1.12 1.33 0.87 0.69 1.07 1.15 2.61 
Slovakia 1.14 1.10 1.23 1.29 0.91 1.24 0.97 1.47 0.90 1.11 1.06 0.98 2.39 
Slovenia 1.04 1.18 1.11 0.77 0.75 1.08 0.98 1.42 0.80 0.93 0.92 0.83 2.62 
Spain 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.00 0.86 1.18 0.89 1.11 0.91 0.91 1.12 0.86 2.33 
Sweden 1.11 1.33 1.17 1.30 0.93 1.04 1.24 1.20 1.20 1.33 0.85 0.84 2.24 
UK 1.30 1.45 1.40 1.33 0.96 1.47 1.09 1.49 1.19 1.00 1.12 0.93 2.13 
Country average 1.14 1.20 1.20 1.14 0.89 1.18 1.06 1.30 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.95 2.43 






























Table D6. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, 















 SD Bipol SD Bipol SD Bipol SD Bipol SD Bipol SD Bipol 
Austria 2.74 31.3 2.56 27.9 2.60 22.82 3.10 35.4 0.94 32.60 3.18 36.3 
Belgium 2.83 14.3 2.67 12.8 2.64 12.87 2.39 25.3 0.95 36.63 2.86 21.5 
Bulgaria 2.84 38.5 2.92 29.8 3.21 37.04 3.11 36.7 0.89 27.91 3.25 43.3 
Croatia 2.74 25.1 2.96 25.6 3.09 27.13 2.86 26.4 0.82 34.21 3.38 41.2 
Cyprus 3.04 32.8 2.90 29.9 2.85 30.27 2.98 41.1 . . 3.10 35.6 
Czech Rep. 2.83 16.8 2.63 17.9 2.65 15.76 2.61 17.4 0.72 15.71 2.94 24.7 
Denmark 2.44 21.8 2.24 11.6 2.29 9.50 2.36 16.5 0.90 32.76 3.19 31.1 
Estonia 2.63 18.1 2.65 18.2 2.58 14.41 2.69 19.4 0.79 18.22 3.05 25.8 
Finland 2.75 19.1 2.45 13.9 2.28 8.52 2.37 20.5 0.89 21.33 2.96 25.9 
France 2.87 19.9 2.49 16.6 2.76 15.75 2.62 19.7 0.98 44.16 2.97 29.0 
Germany 3.04 25.4 2.69 19.6 2.73 15.69 2.66 16.7 0.90 46.47 2.91 22.4 
Greece 2.91 14.5 2.74 22.4 2.80 27.50 2.82 23.3 0.85 27.08 3.06 43.5 
Hungary 3.01 27.6 2.75 20.1 2.78 27.60 2.85 29.5 0.91 40.54 3.07 33.1 
Ireland 2.84 31.2 2.63 18.6 2.42 15.64 2.73 25.0 0.81 19.79 2.97 32.2 
Italy 2.81 21.1 2.75 22.7 2.82 21.80 2.64 19.7 0.82 20.03 3.16 37.1 
Latvia 2.59 21.6 2.76 18.4 2.62 11.97 2.58 20.0 0.84 19.61 2.81 32.3 
Lithuania 2.84 14.8 2.71 13.3 2.77 15.09 2.68 16.3 0.81 22.64 2.77 21.9 
Luxembourg 2.63 13.5 2.36 13.7 2.50 15.55 2.63 19.7 0.92 29.83 3.17 21.0 
Malta 2.97 18.4 2.99 15.2 2.89 31.19 3.34 21.0 0.82 13.77 3.32 32.0 
Netherlands 2.13 34.2 2.17 32.2 2.11 7.87 2.16 43.2 0.80 17.42 2.64 40.3 
Poland 2.93 7.2 2.62 10.0 2.92 20.24 2.44 11.9 0.92 29.17 2.82 16.2 
Portugal 2.72 20.5 2.63 16.0 2.49 12.11 2.09 15.5 0.92 18.97 2.60 27.2 
Romania 3.17 17.1 3.17 14.0 3.34 39.05 2.93 9.4 0.95 33.30 3.23 19.2 
Slovakia 2.89 45.5 2.76 45.1 2.60 17.43 2.80 36.4 0.88 31.71 2.87 39.1 
Slovenia 2.85 17.1 2.89 14.2 2.98 23.62 2.82 20.6 0.75 15.96 2.87 25.4 
Spain 2.60 30.3 2.47 23.1 2.31 9.54 2.28 24.0 0.87 20.97 2.92 29.5 
Sweden 2.57 14.8 2.31 9.4 2.26 14.62 2.39 11.2 0.94 37.43 3.13 26.3 
UK 2.56 16.3 2.56 19.3 2.21 12.47 2.68 20.6 0.78 19.87 2.91 30.8 
             
Average 2.78 22.5 2.66 19.7 2.66 19.0 2.66 22.9 0.87 26.96 3.00 30.1 






















             















East 2.89 27.1 2.74 23.3 2.85 25.1 2.73 23.1 0.89 28.67 3.05 41.0 
North 2.63 17.1 2.42 18.3 2.43 13.7 2.61 21.2 0.94 30.82 3.04 19.4 
South 2.75 19.5 2.51 15.1 2.58 17.2 2.55 17.0 0.80 20.86 3.05 26.3 
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 This question was not asked in Cyprus.  
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Unweighted 2.89 22.3 2.73 19.5 2.75 18.9 2.77 22.6 0.89 27.46 3.07 29.8 
 
Table D7. Polarization of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, 
standard deviation and bipolarization measures, ISSP data 
 INCOME EQUALITY 
3 
ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY 2 CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 ENVIRONMENT 2 
SD Bipol SD Bipol SD Bipol SD Bipol 
Czech Republic 1.01 0.61 0.92 0.34 1.00 0.46 0.72 0.59 
Denmark 1.09 0.38 0.95 0.66 1.17 0.41 0.61 0.49 
Finland 0.89 0.48 1.02 0.49 1.05 0.57 0.72 0.68 
France 0.98 0.47 1.07 0.34 1.13 0.47 0.57 0.51 
Germany 0.90 0.60 0.94 0.41 1.05 0.52 0.63 0.74 
Hungary 0.78 0.40 0.69 0.48 1.00 0.43 0.59 0.48 
Ireland 0.93 0.52 1.04 0.42 1.14 0.39 0.60 0.55 
Latvia 0.79 0.53 0.80 0.53 0.90 0.53 0.66 0.64 
Netherlands 0.95 0.42 0.99 0.45 1.14 0.36 0.77 0.43 
Poland 0.78 0.47 0.75 0.43 0.95 0.54 0.55 0.46 
Portugal 0.65 0.57 0.82 0.37 0.96 0.32 0.57 0.55 
Slovenia 0.70 0.62 0.74 0.60 1.03 0.38 0.60 0.63 
Spain 0.83 0.55 0.87 0.54 1.12 0.50 0.57 0.63 
Sweden 0.99 0.47 1.01 0.49 1.04 0.48 0.72 0.49 
United Kingdom 0.93 0.38 0.94 0.41 1.04 0.50 0.68 0.51 
         
Country average 0.88 0.50 0.90 0.46 1.05 0.46 0.64 0.56 
















         





Table D8. Crosscuttingness of policy preferences in the EU as a whole compared to member states, 
EES data 
 CULTURE X ECONOMIC CULTURE X  
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION1 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 1 X  
ECONOMIC 
Austria 0.972 0.962 0.96 
Belgium 0.824 0.962 0.962 
Bulgaria 0.727 0.956 0.958 
Cyprus 0.823 0.956 0.956 
Czech Rep. 0.883 0.961 0.963 
Denmark 0.904 0.962 0.964 
Estonia 0.754 0.96 0.958 
Finland 0.905 0.959 0.961 
France 0.850 0.962 0.962 
Germany 0.788 0.963 0.963 
Greece 0.842 0.963 0.962 
Hungary 0.778 0.959 0.959 
Ireland 0.934 0.961 0.963 
Italy 0.875 0.959 0.96 
Latvia 0.740 0.959 0.958 
Lithuania 0.857 0.958 0.96 
Luxembourg 0.624 0.962 0.962 
Malta 0.913 0.955 0.955 
Netherlands 0.725 0.962 0.962 
Poland 0.882 0.962 0.962 
Portugal 0.937 0.951 0.954 
Romania 0.915 0.958 0.963 
Slovakia 0.961 0.96 0.96 
Slovenia 0.983 0.959 0.959 
Spain 0.787 0.961 0.963 
Sweden 0.841 0.963 0.965 
UK 0.738 0.96 0.96 
Average 0.843 0.960 0.961 


























MARKET 4 and 
EUROPEAN 








Austria 0.852 0.947 0.987 0.929 
Belgium 0.938 0.940 0.924 0.934 
Bulgaria 0.908 0.947 0.971 0.942 
Croatia 0.983 0.942 0.942 0.956 
Cyprus 0.955 0.956 0.962 0.958 
Czech Rep. 0.911 0.873 0.973 0.919 
Denmark 0.949 0.956 0.864 0.923 
Estonia 0.977 0.944 0.958 0.959 
Finland 0.969 0.910 0.904 0.928 
France 0.982 0.995 0.968 0.982 
Germany 0.773 0.831 0.879 0.828 
Greece 0.975 0.991 0.913 0.959 
Hungary 0.923 0.999 0.937 0.953 
Ireland 0.900 0.986 0.975 0.954 
Italy 0.999 0.943 0.940 0.961 
Latvia 0.951 0.962 0.963 0.959 
Lithuania 0.981 0.988 0.940 0.970 
Luxembourg 0.968 0.935 0.966 0.957 
Malta 0.940 0.819 0.939 0.899 
Netherlands 0.993 0.981 0.880 0.951 
Poland 0.989 0.827 0.994 0.937 
Portugal 0.975 0.944 0.920 0.946 
Romania 0.918 0.958 0.977 0.951 
Slovakia 0.921 1.000 0.973 0.965 
Slovenia 0.967 0.920 0.981 0.956 
Spain 0.921 0.978 0.965 0.955 
Sweden 0.936 0.915 0.851 0.901 
UK 0.967 0.886 0.840 0.898 
     
Country 
average 0.944 0.938 0.939 0.940 




























CIVIL LIBERTIES 2 
Crosscuttingness 
between ECONOMIC 






0.98 0.94 0.63 0.85 
Denmark 0.91 0.89 0.67 0.82 
Finland 0.82 0.97 0.80 0.86 
France 0.95 0.84 0.74 0.84 
Germany 0.85 0.97 0.81 0.88 
Hungary 0.95 0.74 0.75 0.81 
Ireland 0.91 0.99 0.74 0.88 
Latvia 0.90 0.92 0.84 0.89 
Netherlands 0.89 0.88 0.71 0.83 
Poland 0.88 0.93 0.80 0.87 
Portugal 0.98 1.00 0.52 0.83 
Slovenia 0.94 0.97 0.63 0.84 
Spain 0.97 0.89 0.67 0.84 
Sweden 0.83 0.90 0.76 0.83 
United 
Kingdom 
0.99 0.88 0.85 0.91 
     
Country 
average 0.92 0.91 0.73 0.85 










     













WEB-APPENDIX E: REGIONAL CLUSTERS IN THE EU 
 
It is often maintained that the enlargements of the EU towards the South in the 1980s and towards the East 
in the 2000s substantially increased the union’s heterogeneity with regard to the political beliefs and policy 
preferences of its citizens. The question of regional clusters is, amongst other things, relevant to current 
debates about the benefits and costs of maintaining and further extending patterns of differentiated 
integration in the EU.
33
  
It is often assumed that Northern and Southern Europeans, as well as Eastern and Western Europeans, share 
affinities with their neighbours and not with more distant co-Europeans. If this were the case, we would 
expect heterogeneity to be lower in regional sub-sets of the EU than in the EU as a whole. We consider three 
regional sub-sets of the EU: 
North: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Great 
Britain. 
South: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Malta. 
East: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia. 
In addition, we consider a subset of the EU population composed only of residents in countries that were 
already members before 2000, that is, before its significant expansion to include eastern countries (as well as 
Cyprus and Malta), many of which had been under the domination of the Soviet Union less than a 
generation before. This sub-set includes: 
Pre-2000 EU: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, Sweden. 
Table D2 and D6 gives the level of heterogeneity and polarization in each of those sub-sets. As with our 
overall EU measure, these measures are not averages of national scores, but “raw” measures of all 
respondents in a subregion, weighted by population. We find little support for regional clustering within the 
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differentiation in Europe." Journal of European Public Policy 22, no. 6 (2015): 799-815; Kölliker, Alkuin. Flexibility 




EU. Instead, the EU as a whole is never more heterogenous than the most heterogeneous subregion, and is 
often less. Instead, across all dimensions, the EU is comfortably within the range of regional divisions.  
 
